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94552[WIP][FEATURE] Passwordless passkey login for the backend

Benjamin Kott CR 0 V -1 Nightmare +4343 −314 updated 11/19/26, 12:35

Commit message

Initial passkey (WebAuthn / FIDO2) sign-in for the backend, additive to
and falling back on username/password.

Flow so far:

* Usernameless, discoverable-credential login via conditional-UI
  autofill and an explicit "Sign in with a passkey" provider.
* The assertion is verified by the native PasskeyAuthenticator of the
  authentication pipeline, registered for the backend realm before the
  password authenticator. The user is looked up via the
  LocalIdentityProvider. While an extension requires the legacy
  authentication service chain, the passkey login is not offered.
* The steps of a backend login that do not depend on the credential
  type (session, rate limit, request token, session elevation, logging,
  MFA challenge, principal) are shared by the password and passkey
  authenticators in BackendCredentialLogin. The request token check
  moved from the PasswordCredentialVerifier to the new
  LoginRequestTokenVerifier.
* Principals carry proofs: the authentication method references of
  RFC 8176 ("pwd", "hwk", "swk", "user", "mfa") of the login, kept in
  the session. A passkey with user verification proves "mfa" and
  satisfies the multi-factor authentication of the session.
* Self-service enrollment (post-login prompt) and management; admin
  revocation in be_users. Access is decided by the PasskeyVoter, a
  security voter on the principal.
* Per-ceremony services over web-auth/webauthn-lib; credentials in
  be_users_passkeys keyed by an opaque handle.
* Sudo-protected management, single-use host-bound login challenges,
  anti-clone counter, enrollment email.
* Started: a User Settings restructure with a dedicated authentication
  section for password, MFA and passkeys.

Open / still to do:

* User Settings restructure unfinished and currently inconsistent: the
  per-section split landed but the sidebar, controller section
  selection and two-column template are not wired up, so password, MFA
  and passkeys render nowhere yet. Finish schema accessors, controller
  handling, template, workspaces section assignment and the unit test.
* Sudo mode accepts the password only; verifying with a passkey is
  needed before accounts without password are possible.
* No recovery or abuse limits beyond core's login rate limiter (no
  lockout/unlock or out-of-band recovery); admins can revoke but not
  rename another user's passkeys.
* Tests cover the login (software authenticator), the voter and the
  settings schema; the registration ceremony and the controller need
  functional coverage, browser flows were checked only manually.
* @internal, not yet API; class names and labels still need confirming.

Test this change

Run a command in your clone of the TYPO3 Core. Then try what the change does and vote on Verified in Gerrit. How to review a patch

Check out patch set 3
git fetch https://review.typo3.org/Packages/TYPO3.CMS refs/changes/52/94552/3 && git checkout FETCH_HEAD
Cherry-pick onto main
git fetch https://review.typo3.org/Packages/TYPO3.CMS refs/changes/52/94552/3 && git cherry-pick FETCH_HEAD

Review

  • Code review CR 0 Needs a vote
  • Verified V -1 Blocked
    • core-ci -1 CI

Relation chain 2

  1. 94552 [WIP][FEATURE] Passwordless passkey login for the backend This change

  2. main 97756[TASK] Share session resolution of native authenticators This change is based on it Benni Mack CR 0 V 0 Hard +495 −235

Issues 1

Files 60

Show 40 more files

Review log 1012

  1. Benjamin Kott uploaded patch set 1 06/23/26, 09:39

  2. Benjamin Kott commented on patch set 1 06/23/26, 09:41

    EARLY incomplete poc, still needs discussions first before making it public and also requires some prework
  3. Benni Mack commented on patch set 1 07/01/26, 11:47

    just to weigh-in here: Olly H. and me discussed this feature a while ago, the main issue is that passkey is connected to the domain (= web domain). If you enable this in a dev environment, you might not be able to log in to the backend on prod? Haven't tried your solution yet, but this needs to be considered and documented.
  4. Benjamin Franzke commented on patch set 1 07/01/26, 13:00

    Reply

    ack, had/have the same documentation challenge in EXT:mfa_webauthn, see: https://github.com/bnf/mfa_webauthn#using-webauthn-provider-in-production-and-staging-environments
  5. Benjamin Kott wrote 08/09/26, 06:35

    Unset private
  6. Benjamin Kott marked it work in progress 08/09/26, 06:35

  7. Benni Mack uploaded patch set 2 11/18/26, 21:41

  8. Benni Mack uploaded patch set 3 11/18/26, 22:18

  9. core-ci voted on patch set 3 V -1 11/18/26, 22:33 Core CI is not happy: https://git.typo3.org/typo3/CI/cms/-/pipelines/114939

  10. core-ci voted on patch set 2 V -1 11/18/26, 22:42 Core CI is not happy: https://git.typo3.org/typo3/CI/cms/-/pipelines/114934

  11. Sebastian Mendel commented on patch set 3 11/18/26, 22:46

    Points beyond CI and the open list in the commit message: 1. be_users_passkeys.credential_id is varchar(700) and holds the base64url form. WebAuthn L3 allows credential IDs up to 1023 bytes (1364 chars base64url), so credentials with IDs above 525 bytes cannot be stored (error on MySQL strict mode / Postgres). Also, credential_id and passkey_user_handle hold case-sensitive base64url in varchar columns, which compare case-insensitively under utf8mb4_unicode_ci, the collation the installer sets for MySQL/MariaDB. Storing the raw bytes as varbinary (supported by the core schema parser) would fix both. 2. The assertion uses userVerification "preferred". A passkey without UV then logs in passwordless with possession as the only factor; the data set "device-bound passkey without user verification" in BackendUserAuthenticatorTest shows such a login succeeding. Could the assertion require UV, or make it configurable with "required" as default? Registration already requires UV; the code comment mentions authenticators setting the flag inconsistently on assertion, which would be good to back with a concrete case. 3. Enrollment, removal and admin revocation of a passkey write no sys_log entry, and removal is a hard delete. For an authentication credential an audit trail (who added/removed which passkey, admin vs. self) seems needed; a soft revoke (revoked_at/revoked_by) would keep it queryable. 4. There are no PSR-14 events for passkey enrollment and removal (login itself goes through the generic AfterUserLoggedInEvent / LoginAttemptFailedEvent). Extensions that need enforcement or auditing around credential changes have no hook point. Nits: the docblocks of PasskeyAssertionService and PasskeyRepository still mention resolving via makeInstance() from a non-DI service; no such caller exists. A test for "credential of user A submitted with the user handle of user B" would cover the unknown-passkey path.
  12. Sebastian Mendel commented on patch set 3 11/18/26, 23:03

    Unresolved

    My earlier review was posted as a plain change message, which cannot be replied to or resolved. The same points are now inline comments. One more: a test for "credential of user A submitted with the user handle of user B" would cover the unknown-passkey path.

    PasskeyController.php:155 Unresolved

    Enrollment, removal and admin revocation write no sys_log entry, and this is a hard delete. For an authentication credential an audit trail (who added/removed which passkey, admin vs. self) seems needed; a soft revoke (revoked_at/revoked_by) would keep it queryable.

    PasskeyAssertionService.php:39 Unresolved

    Nit: no makeInstance() caller exists for this class (same docblock in PasskeyRepository); the docblock and possibly #[Autoconfigure(public: true)] look stale.

    PasskeyAssertionService.php:153 Unresolved

    userVerification "preferred" (here and in line 71): a passkey without UV logs in passwordless with possession as the only factor; the data set "device-bound passkey without user verification" in BackendUserAuthenticatorTest shows such a login succeeding. Could the assertion require UV, or make it configurable with "required" as default? Registration already requires UV; the comment about authenticators setting the flag inconsistently would be good to back with a concrete case.

    PasskeyRegistrationService.php:132 Unresolved

    There are no PSR-14 events for passkey enrollment and removal (login itself goes through the generic AfterUserLoggedInEvent / LoginAttemptFailedEvent). Extensions that need enforcement or auditing around credential changes have no hook point.

    ext_tables.sql:23 Unresolved

    passkey_user_handle and credential_id hold case-sensitive base64url in varchar columns. Under utf8mb4_unicode_ci, the collation the installer sets for MySQL/MariaDB, lookups compare case-insensitively. Raw bytes in varbinary (e.g. varbinary(64) here) would avoid that.

    ext_tables.sql:33 Unresolved

    credential_id is varchar(700) and holds the base64url form. WebAuthn L3 allows credential IDs up to 1023 bytes (1364 chars base64url), so credentials with IDs above 525 bytes cannot be stored (error on MySQL strict mode / Postgres). Storing the raw bytes as varbinary(1023) would fit every valid ID; the core schema parser supports varbinary.