Issue Task Resolved

#109845Remove MD5 password hint from Install Tool alert email

Oliver Hader 05/17/26, 19:22 updated 05/18/26, 18:10

Description

The failed-login notification email included the last 5 hex characters of an unsalted MD5 hash of the submitted password
(substr(md5($password), -5)), intended as a correlation aid for administrators.

This is not a security vulnerability: the email is delivered only to the configured warning_email_addr (the site admin), and a 20-bit partial hash of the attacker’s own input leaks nothing about the administrator’s actual credential. The real password is protected by bcrypt/Argon2 in configuration.

That said, the partial hash provides no meaningful value over the IP address and timestamp already present in the email, while introducing an unnecessary dependency on MD5. The variable assignment and the corresponding template output are therefore removed.

Thanks to Alex Winder for reporting this finding.

Reviews 3

History 36

  1. Oliver Hader commented <span data-processor="relativetime" data-value="2026-05-17T19:24:12+00:00" > 05/17/26, 19:24 </span>

    Excerpt of the security team response:

    > h3. Who receives the email?
    >
    > The notification is sent exclusively to the site administrator via $TYPO3_CONF_VARS[‘BE’][‘warning_email_addr’]. An attacker who submits a wrong password to the Install Tool already knows what they typed — they gain zero information from the email. An eavesdropper on the email path would learn a 20-bit partial MD5 hash of the attacker’s own submitted guess, not the administrator’s actual password.
    >
    > h3. How much does the 20-bit partial hash help?
    >
    > A 12-character password drawn from the full printable ASCII set (95 characters) has a search space of roughly 5.4 × 10²³ combinations (~79 bits of entropy). Knowing the last 20 bits of the MD5 hash filters that space by a factor of 2²⁰ (~1 million), reducing it to approximately 5.15 × 10¹⁷ candidates and dropping effective entropy to ~59 bits. That is a mathematically real speedup, but it leaves an astronomically large candidate set that cannot be further narrowed without the full 128-bit hash. The administrator’s password is also protected by a modern adaptive hash (bcrypt or Argon2) in the configuration — not by MD5 — so an online brute-force through the install tool itself remains impractical regardless.
    >
    > h3. On rainbow tables
    >
    > A complete MD5 rainbow table covering all 12-character passwords would require on the order of 15 yottabytes of storage, far beyond anything that physically exists. Even if such a table were available, a 20-bit suffix would still leave ~5.15 × 10¹⁷ candidate entries with no way to distinguish the correct one without additional information.
    >
    > h3. What we will do
    >
    > Even though we do not classify this as a security vulnerability, we agree the code has no good justification for including the partial hash in the notification email. The administrator already has the IP address and timestamp, which are sufficient for incident correlation. We will remove the MD5 computation and the lastCharactersOfPassword variable from the Install Tool login failure notification in an upcoming regular release.
    >

  2. Oliver Hader commented and changed status Under Review Resolved done 0 % 100 % <span data-processor="relativetime" data-value="2026-05-18T18:10:11+00:00" > 05/18/26, 18:10 </span>

    Applied in changeset commit:5e4ca0f0217fb0c2e648d949637cd6fd70b62bb6.