#110088Harden redirects history rollback processing
Description
Reports to the security team:
2026051610000028 (Ahmed Badawe)
> Step-by-step exploit
> ——————————
> 1. The attacker authenticates to the backend as a regular editor (any non-admin BE user).
> 2. Loading any backend page yields `TYPO3.settings.ajaxUrls.redirects_revert_correlation` containing the route URL and a valid per-session route token. The token is generated indiscriminately for every AJAX route in `PageRenderer::addAjaxUrlsToInlineSettings()`.
> 3. The attacker issues `GET /typo3/ajax/redirects/revert/correlation?token=<token>&correlation_ids[]=<correlation_id>`.<br>> 4. `BackendModuleValidator::process()` does not enforce a module check (no `inheritAccessFromModule`, no bound `module`), and forwards the request to `RouteDispatcher::dispatch()`.<br>> 5. `RouteDispatcher` validates the route token. Token is valid because it was minted for the same authenticated user.<br>> 6. `RecordHistoryRollbackController::revertCorrelation()` resolves the correlation id, `TemporaryPermissionMutationService` adds `sys_redirect` to the attacker’s `tables_select` and `tables_modify`, `RecordHistory::findEventsForCorrelation()` returns matching history rows, and `RecordHistoryRollback::performRollback(‘ALL’, …)` issues a `DataHandler` write that reverts the matching `sys_redirect` records to their historical state.<br>> 7. Temporary `sys_redirect` permissions are removed; the modified DB state remains.<br>> <br>> Impact<br>> ———<br>> – Integrity: a backend user who has no redirect-management authorization can revert any `sys_redirect` record whose change history matches the supplied correlation id. Source host, source path, and target URL can all be silently reverted to prior values, including to redirect destinations that were previously rejected or removed by an administrator. This can revive phishing/abuse redirects an admin had cleaned up.<br>> – Availability: a redirect can be rolled back into a state that conflicts with current site routing.<br>> – Confidentiality: not affected directly. (No data exfiltration via the response.)<br>> <br>> CVSS v4.0 (reporter estimate):<br>> `AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` — Medium.</correlation_id></token>
2026061410000039 (Nir Yehoshua)
> Correlation rollback IDOR (EXT:redirects)
> An editor without sys_redirect in tables_modify can delete auto-created
> redirects via GET /typo3/ajax/redirects/revert/correlation using a stolen
> correlation_id. Verified: redirect count 3→2, {status“ok”}.
> Same endpoint is GET-based and accepts route token from query string (CSRF
> exposure when token leaks). v14 regression vs v13.4.31 aspect guard.
Reviews 3
History 712
-
Oliver Hader commented <span data-processor="relativetime" data-value="2026-06-23T13:25:48+00:00" > 06/23/26, 13:25 </span>
In case this would be considered a vulnerability, the CVSS 4.0 would look like https://vulnogram.org/cvss4?CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N ( 2.3, low )- AC:H – “stealing the CorrelationID” either would require another SQLi vulnerability or good luck with brute-forcing the 128bit space of md5
- AT:P – change affecting slugs need to be stored in sys_history (which references the “stolen CorrelationID”)
- VCIA:* – only the integrity aspect would be relevant here
-
Oliver Hader commented <span data-processor="relativetime" data-value="2026-06-23T13:31:28+00:00" > 06/23/26, 13:31 </span>
A CorrelationID looks like
0400$914116cc33be546a9eb454d4a460510a:c75354c439a48dbde16b03ac553a080d/5d8e6e70/redirect– where the first part (between “$” and” is a unique string, passed through MD5 and maintained inDataHandler).Granting
sys_redirecttemp. permissions in the rollback controller is done on purpose – the remaining permissions (pages, content, etc.) remain unchanged andDataHandleris about to enforce the permissions – incl. source and target forsys_redirectrecords. -
Gerrit Code Review changed status
NewUnder Review <span data-processor="relativetime" data-value="2026-06-23T13:32:02+00:00" > 06/23/26, 13:32 </span> Patch set 2 for branch *main* of project *Teams/Security/TYPO3v4-Core* has been pushed to the review server. It is available at https://review.typo3.org/c/Teams/Security/TYPO3v4-Core/+/94555 -
Oliver Hader commented <span data-processor="relativetime" data-value="2026-06-24T12:14:58+00:00" > 06/24/26, 12:14 </span>
Note
This change is not classified as a security vulnerability, since the rollback endpoint only grants exceptional permissions for sys_redirect; all other table access during rollback still relies on DataHandler’s regular permission checks.
Conclusion
This change is handled with the regular public workflow, no security handling, no CVE, no advisory.
-
Oliver Hader changed target version <span data-processor="relativetime" data-value="2026-06-24T12:15:12+00:00" > 06/24/26, 12:15 </span>
-
Oliver Hader changed project id target version <span data-processor="relativetime" data-value="2026-06-24T12:15:35+00:00" > 06/24/26, 12:15 </span>
-
Gerrit Code Review pushed patch set 1 for main to change 94567 <span data-processor="relativetime" data-value="2026-06-24T12:16:03+00:00" > 06/24/26, 12:16 </span>
-
Gerrit Code Review pushed patch set 1 for 14.3 to change 94577 <span data-processor="relativetime" data-value="2026-06-25T07:15:04+00:00" > 06/25/26, 07:15 </span>
-
Gerrit Code Review pushed patch set 1 for 13.4 to change 94578 <span data-processor="relativetime" data-value="2026-06-25T07:16:43+00:00" > 06/25/26, 07:16 </span>
-
Gerrit Code Review pushed patch set 2 for 13.4 to change 94578 <span data-processor="relativetime" data-value="2026-06-25T08:29:41+00:00" > 06/25/26, 08:29 </span>
-
Oliver Hader commented and changed status
Under ReviewResolved done0 %100 % <span data-processor="relativetime" data-value="2026-06-25T08:50:12+00:00" > 06/25/26, 08:50 </span>Applied in changeset commit:912937c80625e963256fdbbf14217a1d17255813.
-
Benni Mack changed status
ResolvedClosed <span data-processor="relativetime" data-value="2026-08-11T08:50:57+00:00" > 08/11/26, 08:50 </span>